Summary
Key takeaways
- The first release of the AI Prototype-to-Production Failure Database contains 14 verified public records drawn from court decisions, regulator actions, company postmortems, peer-reviewed research, and investigative reporting.
- Thirteen of the 14 recorded failures reached users or operational production before the issue was documented, while one was stopped at a release gate before broad deployment.
- Nine records fall into the high or urgent control-priority bands, but the score is intended to prioritize preventive engineering work rather than rank companies or vendors.
- All 14 incidents are classified as multi-causal, showing that visible model errors usually combine with failures in architecture, state, permissions, evaluation, recovery, or ownership.
- Evaluation is the most common primary category, accounting for seven records, but most evaluation failures also involve secondary operating or system-control gaps.
- The recurring missing controls are accountable human review, task-relevant evaluation, observability, authoritative grounding, rollback, recovery, and environment or permission isolation.
- Production failures can occur even when the model itself behaves as expected, as shown by configuration, database, rollback, state-management, and infrastructure incidents included in the dataset.
- Business rules, permissions, and irreversible actions should not remain inside prompts or model behaviour; they should be enforced through deterministic services and explicit system boundaries.
- Generated output does not remove organizational accountability: companies remain responsible for customer promises, legal filings, automated decisions, production actions, and incident response.
- The database is designed as an engineering prevention resource, not as a complete sample of AI projects, a vendor ranking, or a measurement of total financial, human, or reputational harm.
When this applies
This applies when a company is moving an AI prototype, RAG system, chatbot, agent, predictive model, coding assistant, or autonomous workflow into a real customer-facing or operational environment. It is particularly useful for architecture reviews, production-readiness assessments, security reviews, regulated workflows, healthcare systems, high-authority content generation, and applications where AI can modify durable state or trigger external actions. Teams can use the failure records to create hidden tests, failure-injection scenarios, approval requirements, observability standards, rollback plans, and named ownership before launch.
When this does not apply
This does not apply as a statistical estimate of how often AI projects fail or as proof that the named organizations currently have weak systems. The records are a curated public evidence set that overrepresents visible, regulated, and newsworthy incidents, and the available technical detail differs between sources. The database should also not replace environment-specific threat modeling, load testing, red teaming, legal review, penetration testing, or production architecture approval. Its root-cause and missing-control classifications are editorial interpretations rather than admissions by the organizations involved.
Checklist
- Move business rules, permissions, limits, and irreversible actions out of prompts and into deterministic services.
- Define explicit workflow states, transitions, ownership, and permitted actions.
- Add idempotency controls so retries cannot repeat payments, messages, deletions, or other side effects.
- Require human approval before legal, financial, safety-critical, destructive, or customer-impacting actions.
- Create task-specific offline evaluation datasets before production release.
- Test performance across relevant user groups, edge cases, adversarial inputs, and real-world conditions.
- Use hidden evaluations that the model or agent cannot optimize against directly.
- Ground authoritative answers in verified sources and preserve provenance for generated output.
- Threat-model prompts, tools, credentials, data access, tenant boundaries, external content, and MCP integrations.
- Separate development, testing, staging, and production environments with scoped credentials and technical access controls.
- Add logs and traces for prompts, retrieved context, tool calls, decisions, state changes, approvals, and outcomes.
- Implement timeouts, retry limits, circuit breakers, fallbacks, backups, kill switches, and tested rollback procedures.
- Set measurable budgets for tokens, cost, latency, context growth, retries, and model uncertainty.
- Assign a named production owner, incident route, support model, and change-governance process.
- Run staged rollouts, load tests, failure injection, recovery exercises, and production-parity checks before scaling.
Common pitfalls
- Treating a successful prototype demonstration as evidence that the system is production-ready.
- Evaluating general model quality instead of the exact task, population, authority level, and production workflow.
- Leaving approvals, permissions, and business rules inside natural-language instructions.
- Allowing an agent to mutate production state with credentials that are broader than the task requires.
- Testing model outputs while ignoring infrastructure, configuration, database, retry, and rollback failure modes.
- Launching without a named person accountable for generated output and production behaviour.
- Presenting generated advice as authoritative without grounding it in current policy, law, or approved documentation.
- Monitoring uptime while failing to observe model behaviour, subgroup performance, tool actions, state transitions, and auditability.
- Assuming staging or canary testing will expose failures when those environments do not reproduce production scale or connection limits.
- Treating corrective controls from a public incident as a complete architecture design without adapting them to the actual environment.
Original incident synthesis by Uvik Software
Research disclosure: Uvik Software publishes this database and provides AI application rescue and production-hardening services. No organization can pay for inclusion, exclusion, a lower control-priority score or a more favorable classification.
Executive answer: The first release contains 14 verified public records across court decisions, regulator actions, company postmortems, peer-reviewed research and investigative reports. 9 records fall into the high or urgent control-priority bands, 14 are coded as multi-causal, and 13 reached users or operational production before the failure was documented. The most repeated gaps are task-relevant evaluation, accountable human review, observability, permission or environment isolation, recovery controls and authoritative grounding.
Key findings
- 14 records are included in the versioned candidate dataset.
- 10 records have an evidence-confidence score of 85 or higher.
- 9 records score 60 or higher on control priority; this is a prevention-priority measure, not a vendor ranking.
- 14 records combine more than one root-cause or failure layer.
- 13 records occurred after a public or operational release; one record documents a launch gate that was reversed before broad production.
- Evaluation is the largest primary category with 7 records.
- Healthcare contributes two independently researched examples where real-world performance or fairness differed materially from the original optimization target.
- The dataset includes both model failures and ordinary production-engineering failures around configuration, rollback, state, permissions and ownership.
Evaluation is the most common primary category in the candidate record set, but most incidents also include secondary system or operating failures.
What qualifies as a database record
A record needs a stable public source or an explicitly authorized assessment. The source must establish that an AI or algorithmic system reached a real operating workflow, public pilot, customer interface, filed professional output or production release gate. The database separates three layers:
| Layer | What it contains | Rule |
|---|---|---|
| Source facts | What the court, regulator, company, researchers or investigators documented | Must remain faithful to the source and retain a URL and date |
| Editorial root-cause coding | Uvik Software classification of trigger, root cause, missing control and corrective control | Must be visibly labeled as interpretation |
| Scores | Evidence confidence and control-priority score | Must be reproducible from published component fields |
The candidate release favors court, regulator, company and peer-reviewed sources, with carefully labeled investigative records where no primary postmortem exists.
Failure taxonomy
| Category | Definition | Preventive controls |
|---|---|---|
| Architecture boundary | Business rules, permissions or side effects are left inside prompts or agent behavior instead of deterministic services. | Typed service boundaries; server-side rules; least-privilege APIs; explicit ownership |
| State and workflow | The system loses state, repeats actions, bypasses approvals or cannot recover safely. | State machines; idempotency; durable queues; approvals; replay tests |
| Evaluation | The product reaches users without task-relevant, subgroup, adversarial or real-world validation. | Acceptance datasets; subgroup tests; hidden tests; staged rollout; continuous evaluation |
| Security and data | The system exposes secrets, data, tenants or high-impact tools beyond intended authority. | Threat modeling; scoped credentials; isolation; validation; audit logs |
| Reliability and recovery | The system lacks safe fallback, rollback, timeout, retry or incident controls. | Circuit breakers; backups; rollback; kill switches; runbooks |
| Cost and latency | Model uncertainty, retries, context growth or operational constraints create unsustainable cost or delay. | Budgets; routing; caching; capacity limits; uncertainty-aware controls |
| Maintainability | AI-assisted outputs enter production without provenance, tests, documentation or accountable review. | Versioning; code review; deterministic tests; source verification; documentation |
| Ownership and adoption | No named owner is accountable for generated outputs, operating controls, support or corrective action. | Named production owner; escalation path; support model; governance and training |
A visible model error is often only the trigger. Production impact depends on architecture, state, permissions, evaluation, recovery and ownership.
All published candidate records
| ID | Incident | Primary category | Stage | Evidence confidence | Control priority | Band | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AIPF-2026-003 | Facial-recognition false positives triggered consumer accusations | Security and data | Scaled production across hundreds of stores | 99 | 91 | Urgent systemic control priority | Source |
| AIPF-2026-008 | Healthcare risk algorithm underestimated Black patients’ needs | Evaluation | Scaled production | 93 | 89 | Urgent systemic control priority | Source |
| AIPF-2026-006 | Cruise vehicle dragged a pedestrian and the company filed incomplete reports | Reliability and recovery | Limited public deployment | 98 | 84 | Urgent systemic control priority | Source |
| AIPF-2026-007 | External validation found poor performance in a widely deployed sepsis model | Evaluation | Deployed across hundreds of hospitals | 93 | 83 | Urgent systemic control priority | Source |
| AIPF-2026-004 | Zillow Offers was wound down after forecasting and operational volatility | Cost and latency | Scaled production | 91 | 79 | High control priority | Source |
| AIPF-2026-013 | Replit AI agent reportedly deleted a live production database during a code freeze | State and workflow | Live application environment | 76 | 78 | High control priority | Source |
| AIPF-2026-002 | Automated tutor screening rejected applicants by age | Evaluation | Scaled production | 93 | 74 | High control priority | Source |
| AIPF-2026-009 | NYC MyCity chatbot gave businesses inaccurate and illegal advice | Evaluation | Public beta | 78 | 66 | High control priority | Source |
| AIPF-2026-011 | Lawyers filed fabricated judicial opinions generated by ChatGPT | Maintainability | Filed court submission | 98 | 61 | High control priority | Source |
| AIPF-2026-001 | Air Canada chatbot invented a retroactive bereavement-fare process | Evaluation | Customer-facing production | 97 | 56 | Material control priority | Source |
| AIPF-2026-010 | Microsoft shifted Recall from broad launch to Insider preview after security feedback | Security and data | Pre-production release gate | 82 | 50 | Material control priority | Source |
| AIPF-2026-005 | Gemini image generation of people was paused after inaccurate and offensive outputs | Evaluation | Public rollout | 87 | 45 | Material control priority | Source |
| AIPF-2026-012 | ChatGPT outage followed a Redis connection-limit misconfiguration | Reliability and recovery | Scaled production | 90 | 45 | Material control priority | Source |
| AIPF-2026-014 | DPD chatbot was disabled after producing abusive and brand-damaging responses | Evaluation | Customer-facing production | 68 | 31 | Bounded control priority | Source |
The control-priority score is not a severity ranking of organizations. It estimates how urgently an engineering team should address the coded control pattern when designing a similar system.
How scoring works
Evidence confidence
| Component | Maximum | Question |
|---|---|---|
| Source authority | 40 | Is the source a court, regulator, company postmortem, peer-reviewed study or lower-authority report? |
| Corroboration | 20 | Is the material supported by more than one independent or complementary source? |
| Specificity | 20 | Are dates, scope, outcomes and technical details stated precisely? |
| Rights clarity | 10 | Can the database safely publish a factual summary and source link? |
| Technical traceability | 10 | Can the trigger and missing controls be mapped without speculation? |
Control priority
| Component | Maximum |
|---|---|
| Observable impact | 25 |
| Blast radius | 15 |
| Irreversibility | 15 |
| Detection latency | 10 |
| Legal or regulatory consequence | 10 |
| Control-gap breadth | 15 |
| Recurrence potential | 10 |
Each component is available in the CSV. The included Python script recalculates both totals and blocks a final public scoring mode until source-owner preview and security-lead approval are complete.
The score helps prioritize preventive engineering work; it does not certify products or assign blame.
Recurring missing-control families
| Control family | Records with the pattern |
|---|---|
| Human approval or accountable review | 12 of 14 |
| Independent or task-relevant evaluation | 11 of 14 |
| Observability and auditability | 11 of 14 |
| Authoritative grounding or provenance | 5 of 14 |
| Rollback, recovery or kill switch | 4 of 14 |
| Environment or permission isolation | 1 of 14 |
Independent evaluation and accountable review appear repeatedly, but production isolation and rollback are equally important in agentic and stateful systems.
Evaluation failures
The dataset includes several different evaluation problems:
- The Epic Sepsis Model performed materially worse under independent real-world validation than its developer-reported result.
- A healthcare risk algorithm optimized cost rather than health need, reproducing structural racial disparities.
- Gemini’s image-generation tuning failed in historical and context-specific prompts and was paused.
- Government and airline chatbots provided authoritative-looking guidance that contradicted law or policy.
- Rite Aid deployed facial recognition without adequate accuracy testing, subgroup analysis or false-positive monitoring.
These are not one failure mode. They show why evaluation needs to match the actual decision, user population, authority level and impact of the production workflow.
State, permission and environment failures
Agentic systems add a separate class of risk: the model can trigger tools or mutate durable state. The reported Replit incident illustrates why a code freeze written in natural language is not a production control. Development and production data need technical separation, scoped credentials, explicit destructive-action approval and tested recovery.
The same principle appears in autonomous systems. Cruise’s post-collision behavior required a deterministic minimal-risk state and trustworthy event reporting. Prompt instructions or model intent cannot replace a state machine for irreversible or safety-critical actions.
Reliability and recovery failures
The OpenAI Redis incident was not a model-quality failure. It was a production configuration failure in an AI service. Staging, canary and dual writing did not reach the connection threshold that exposed the misconfiguration. The corrective pattern is conventional but essential: typed configuration, parity checks, load testing, telemetry and a rehearsed rollback.
This is why the database includes ordinary distributed-systems failures. AI prototypes do not become production-ready merely because model outputs improve.
Ownership and authority failures
Air Canada’s tribunal case and Mata v. Avianca show a common operating mistake: generated text entered a high-authority workflow without a named person or system boundary responsible for verification. The answer may come from a model, but the organization still owns the policy, legal filing, customer promise or production action.
Source and rights workflow
- Identify a stable public source or a first-party assessment with explicit publication rights.
- Record the evidence class, source date, rights status and capture date.
- Extract only the facts needed to explain the engineering pattern.
- Keep source facts separate from Uvik Software interpretation.
- Run technical review of taxonomy, root causes and corrective controls.
- Run legal and privacy review where the record contains confidential or potentially identifying information.
- Send a private preview to the named organization, vendor or source owner when feasible.
- Publish only after required approvals and version every material correction.
Public evidence, editorial coding, rights review and versioned corrections remain separate steps.
Anonymization and client material
Version 1.0-rc1 contains no client records. Future Uvik Software assessment patterns can be included only when publication rights are explicit and re-identification risk is acceptably low. Removing a company name is not sufficient. Industry, geography, architecture, dates, team size, customer count and unusual failure details can identify an organization when combined.
When useful technical detail cannot be preserved safely, the record must remain private.
How to use the database
- Turn each missing-control field into an architecture-review question.
- Create hidden tests and failure-injection scenarios from recurring triggers.
- Prioritize rare high-impact controls separately from common low-impact defects.
- Review whether state, permissions, evaluations, observability and rollback have named owners.
- Use the corrective-control field as a starting point, not as an environment-specific design approval.
Production-readiness checklist
- Move business rules, permissions and irreversible actions into deterministic services.
- Define explicit state transitions, idempotency, approvals and replay behavior.
- Create offline, subgroup, adversarial and online evaluation baselines.
- Threat-model prompts, tools, data access, tenant boundaries and secrets.
- Add timeouts, retries, circuit breakers, backups, fallbacks and kill switches.
- Set cost, token, latency and uncertainty budgets with telemetry.
- Require tests, provenance, versioned prompts, dependency controls and architecture documentation.
- Assign a production owner, incident route, support model and change-governance process.
Download the data
JSON note: JSON is intentionally not generated in this package. The production site should generate it automatically from the final CSV and preserve the same field names, dataset version, methodology version and capture date.
Limitations
- The dataset is a curated evidence set, not a random sample of AI projects.
- Public incidents overrepresent visible, regulated and newsworthy failures.
- Source technical detail varies substantially.
- Root-cause and missing-control fields are editorial coding, not admissions by the named organization.
- The score prioritizes preventive controls and cannot measure total financial, human or reputational harm.
- Source-owner preview and final approvals are not complete in version 1.0-rc1.
Corrections and submissions
A correction must identify the record ID, disputed field, current value, proposed value and a stable public source. Confidential submissions remain private unless the submitter grants explicit publication rights and the record passes technical, legal, privacy and re-identification review.
Commercial handoff
Prototype works but the production boundary is unclear? Uvik Software audits code, agents, state, permissions, evaluations, observability and recovery, then produces a keep, change and rebuild plan under NDA. Request an AI production-readiness assessment.
Primary sources
- BC Civil Resolution Tribunal – Moffatt v. Air Canada
- EEOC – iTutorGroup settlement
- FTC – Rite Aid facial recognition action
- Zillow – Zillow Offers wind-down
- Google – Gemini image-generation postmortem
- NHTSA – Cruise consent order
- JAMA Internal Medicine – Epic Sepsis Model validation
- PubMed – racial bias in healthcare risk algorithm
- The Markup – NYC MyCity chatbot investigation
- Microsoft – Recall preview update
- Mata v. Avianca sanctions order
- OpenAI – ChatGPT Redis outage postmortem
- AI Incident Database – reported Replit agent incident
- Time – DPD chatbot incident
- AI Incident Database research paper
Frequently asked questions
Are these Uvik Software client failures?
No. This article uses public sources only. Client patterns require explicit publication rights and legal and privacy review.
Does the database rank AI vendors?
No. It classifies failure patterns and preventive control priorities. The scores apply to the reviewed record, not the vendor's complete product or current system.
Why include non-generative systems such as facial recognition and risk scoring?
The database focuses on the production boundary around AI systems. Validation, data, monitoring, recovery and ownership failures recur across predictive, generative and agentic systems.
Why are some records based on research rather than a public incident?
Independent research can reveal a production failure that the deploying organization did not publish, such as poor external validation or systematic subgroup bias.
Can an organization request a correction?
Yes. Submit the record ID, disputed field and a public evidence URL. Material corrections are versioned and shown in the changelog.
Can I submit a confidential failure pattern?
Yes, but it remains private unless explicit publication rights are granted and the record passes legal, privacy and re-identification review.